

**PARTIAL EFFECT OF THREE COMPONENTS PROFIT MANAGEMENT ON THE PERFORMANCE OF FOOD AND BEVERAGE COMPANIES ON PERIOD 2017-2021 IDX LIST**

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**Abstract:** The purpose of this study is to determine whether tax planning, managerial premiums and information asymmetry have a partial impact on the financial performance of companies in the food and beverage subsector that are on the IDX for five years. According to agency theory, tax planning, bonus management and the associated information asymmetry in revenue management interact synergistically with company performance. The aim of this study is to causally and descriptively analyze the performance of companies in the food and beverage industry with the three components of revenue management from 2017 to 2021. SPSS is a statistical testing tool using multiple regression analysis as a research method. The documentation technique begins with data collection and then data analysis techniques to analyze the financial reports of each food and beverage company from 2017 to 2021 on the IDX list. The results of the research show that tax planning and information asymmetry have no impact on firm performance, while management bonuses do have an impact on firm performance. From this it can be concluded that improving company performance must be accompanied by granting higher management bonuses to outstanding employees.

**Keywords:** Three Component, Profit Management, Company Performance

### **1. Introduction**

Measuring management's performance on the basis of profit leads management to encourage changes in management's presentation of profit or results management due to management's discretion in presenting results (PSAK, 2017:1).because it is assumed that the measure of performance of the Managements is to increase the maximum profit, which is an important parameter of financial reporting as the end result describe objective of doing business within the company with all responsibility for the performance of a company (Setyawan, 2021).

Mulatsih et al. (2019), when management improves the quality of earnings, it faces a situation where the level of profit reflects the impact on the company, in particular, its financial performance is good, which also has an impact on high tax revenues. Minimizing the tax burden is the first step in tax planning to carry out income management and does not constitute a violation of the rules in preparing corporate tax planning. It is a method by which corporate management (taxpayers) manages corporate taxes (Prasetyo et al., 2019).

The fall of yield management as a phenomenon can be seen in Indonesia as follows: the funds have been inflated by 4 trillion and there is also revenue of 662 billion, the rest is 329 billion TBK (Ebitda) of Tiga Pilar Sejahtera Food Company (Wareza, 2019), Bentoel's net loss was 312.32 billion, causing a 42% decline in the last half, but sales rose 0.29%. Upon successful achievement of the company's goals, executives with outstanding performance receive a bonus as an additional incentive for their contribution to increasing the company's maximum profit (Afrizal, 2018).

Brahmono et al. (2022) found that revenue management is efficient and has a positive impact on the future to achieve company performance. Reduction of future period costs from current costs and vice versa through income equalization by recognizing current income as future periods. And when profits are high, management tends to minimize profits (revenue minimalism), thereby reducing tax costs, which in turn affects the company's

net profit (Sulistiyanto, 2018).

## 2. Literature Review

### 2.1. Agency Theory

The backgrounds and interests of principals and managers are so contradictory that they cause conflict over their respective interests, this is called agency conflict (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The existence of access to information asymmetry makes managers as parties who know more company information compared to other parties (investors). This is why earnings management was carried out by agents, so companies need to reduce reporting imbalances between agents and principals to help investors make decisions about their investments (Yanti & Setiawan, 2019).

### 2.2. Tax Planning

The existence of tax savings reduces the tax burden, so the company's profits are increased, and the managers' performance is seen as a contribution to the company, so the company does not hesitate to give bonuses to its managers. This is how managers behave in the practice of intentionally increasing profits using various methods of obtaining maximum interest (Astutik, 2016).

### 2.3. Management Bonuses

Elfira (2014) was told the same thing, contributing to the achievement of organizational goals is appropriate for managers, so managers focus on increasing company profits so that they receive maximum bonuses. The bonuses are calculated on the basis of regular success or the achievement of targeted profits by the company. The company runs a dividend plan in order to achieve the profit equalization promised by the company and thus achieve the maximum profit target. Profit management practices can be undertaken when management believes that certain profit targets cannot be met (Dewi et al., 2018).

### 2.4. Information Asymmetry

When transactions are performed by the principal-agent, there is an information asymmetry as both seek to maximize their respective interests, so there is strong reason to believe that the agent's actions are not as good as possible for the principal's interests (Easley & O'Hara, 2004). Experienced investors investing in the market will always look for information about companies buying shares first before investing (Syaddah et al., 2020). The more relevant information investors have, the more confident they are in investing, making the market more efficient (Manurung, 2013).

### 2.5. Company Performance

The tendency is related to the accounting choice method that management consciously chooses to achieve business goals (Azizi et al., 2018). Profit and loss report is the core of manipulation in financial reporting, which is widely used by companies where the manipulation process is done intentionally (Indrawati, 2016), but the direction for profit reporting for a specific period follows the financial accounting standards, which are known as Yield management, which is related to an increase in a company's profit or company performance (Putri et al., 2016), since the profit achieved receives a bonus on the success of the manager (Yanto & Lubis, 2018).

## 3. Research Methods


Analyze the performance of companies in the food and beverage industry with the three components of revenue management from 2017 to 2021. SPSS is a statistical testing tool using multiple regression analysis as a research method. The documentation technique begins with data collection and then data analysis techniques to analyze the financial reports of each food and beverage company from 2017 to 2021 on the IDX list. Population is 30 companies, the population that is reachable for a sample of 14 companies for five years so there are 70 observation samples.

Researchers obtained financial report data for each food and beverage sector company on the IDX list for 2017-2021 and the calculations were used as indicators from each variable.

**Table 1. Variable Operations As Indicators**

Variable	Indicators
Tax Planning	Net Income it / Pretax Income it
Management Bonuses	Score of 1 if the company offers bonus compensation (bonus program) and 0 if it does not.
Information Asymmetry	$\frac{askprice - bidprice}{\frac{(askprice + bidprice)}{2}} \times 100\%$
Company Performance	EAT <hr/> Averate Asset


**Research model that is formed**



**3. Results and Discussion**

**Normality Test**

Testing whether the data from the regression (Priyatno, Duwi. , 2014:90) is normally distributed or not with a scatter plot shows that a set of points does not form a clear pattern, so the scatter of a set of points is also above Da points below the number 0 on the y-axis, the data are normally distributed.



**Autocorrelation Test**

The autocorrelation test is used as a test for the presence of an autocorrelation in research. According to (Priyono, 2016), the following conclusions can be drawn from the detection of autocorrelation:  $dU < d < 4-dU$ , so there is no autocorrelation.

**Mdel Sumry<sup>b</sup>**

Mdel	R	R-Sqre	Adst- R-Sqre	Std-Err. of the Estima	Durbin-Watson
1	,509 <sup>a</sup>	,259	,213	,09968	1,873

a. Predictrs: (Cons), Perencanaan\_Pajak, Asimetri\_Informasi, Bonus\_Manajemen

b. Depend- Var: Kinerja-Perusahaan

The above data explains the following:  $N = 70$  and  $K4$ , then the value of  $DL = 1.4943$  and  $DU = 1.7351$   $dU < d < 4-dU \rightarrow$  no autocorrelation:  $1.7351 < 1.873 < 2.2649$

**Statistical t test**

Testing T aims to affect tax planning (X1), management bonus (X2), and information asymmetry (X3) on firm performance variables.

**Table 2. Statistical t test**

From table 2, it can be seen tax planning has a value sig.  $0.779 > 0.05$ , indicating that tax planning does not affect company performance, management bonuses have a sig value.  $0.000 < 0.05$ , indicating that management bonuses

Mdel		Unstan-Coeffi		Stan-Coeffi		
		B	Std-Err	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Const)	0,015	0,052		0,277	0,782
	Tax_Planning	-0,016	0,056	-0,030	-0,282	0,779
	Management_Bonuses	0,131	0,030	0,484	4,324	0,000
	Informationi_Asymmetry	-0,010	0,019	-0,055	-0,491	0,625

a. Dependent-Var: Kinerja\_Perusahaan

Source: Data processed with statistical test equipment

affect company performance and information asymmetry has a significant value.  $0.625 > 0.05$ , indicating that information asymmetry does not affect company performance.

#### Tax Planning on Company Performance

Tax planning (X1) on company performance (Y) The test results of the study showed that tax planning received a significant value.  $0.779 > 0.05$  means tax plans partially have no impact on firm performance, consistent with Purnama (2020) research. Because companies that do less tax planning can offer investors more transparency and publish more transparent financial information.

#### Management Bonuses on Company Performance

The test explains that management bonuses affect company performance with a value of sig.  $0.000 < 0.05$ . This is because the management implemented a bonus program. The more implementation of management bonuses in the company, the better the possibility of increasing performance in the company according to research by Durana et al. (2022).

#### Information Asymmetry on Company Performance

The results of the study show the sign.  $0.625 > 0$ , which means that information asymmetry has no impact on company performance. This shows that the information asymmetry in company performance is often not taken into account by management as the company is performing well and previous financial reports may contain errors that do not conform to quality principles (Maulina et al., 2018).

#### 4. Conclusions and Suggestions

From the discussion, seen from the statistical t test, tax planning and information asymmetry partially do not affect company performance and management bonuses partially affect company performance so that if companies want to improve company performance, it is suggested that management should make tax planning regularly and further minimizing information asymmetry and providing more management bonus contributions to competent employees so that employees are comfortable staying in the company and advancing the company's performance.

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